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Abstract: I will argue that the cognitive-linguistic enterprise should step up its
efforts to embrace the social and pragmatic dimensions of language. This claim
will be derived from a survey of the premises and promise of the cognitive-
linguistic approach to the study of language and be defended in more detail on
logical and empirical grounds. Key elements of a usage-based emergentist socio-
cognitive approach known as Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model
(Schmid 2014, 2015) will be presented in order to demonstrate how social and
pragmatic aspects can be integrated and operationalized in a cognitive-linguistic
framework.
Keywords: social turn in Cognitive Linguistics, pragmatics and Cognitive
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1 Introduction: Premises, promise,
and predicament of the cognitive-linguistic
enterprise
In my view, three main premises motivate the cognitive-linguistic enterprise: the
cognitivist, the usage-based, and the emergentist premise. The cognitivist
premise is that language interacts with other domains of cognition – notably
categorization, memory, attention, perception, and reasoning – and follows the
same cognitive principles as these (Ungerer and Schmid 2006: 343–346 et
passim). The usage-based premise is that grammatical structure derives from
experience in concrete usage events (Langacker 1988), and the emergentist that
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shared linguistic knowledge is continuously reorganized by a variety of
different mechanisms under the influence of language use (MacWhinney and
O’Grady 2015).
The main promise of the cognitive-linguistic enterprise derives from these
premises: cognitive linguists feel able to produce adequate and psychologically
plausible explanations of cross-linguistically valid structural properties of
language and of individual language-specific constructions.
Combining the premises and promise, the main assumptions behind
Cognitive Linguistics can be summarized by formulating the explanandum
(a) and the explanantia (b) to (e):
(a) The way language works and is structured can be modeled as deriving from
(b) general cognitive principles,
(c) experience in usage events,
(d) processes that are responsible for the way in which experience is
transformed into knowledge,
(e) and the interaction between them.
So far, cognitive-linguistic research hasmademuchmore progress on explanans (b)
than on (c), (d), and (e). We have been highly successful in detailing the ways in
which linguistic structures can be explained and even assumed to be motivated by
fundamental cognitive principles. In contrast, we seem to know much less about
how these general cognitive principles interact (see explanans [e] above) with the
online processing of linguistic experience in usage events (c), and with the diverse
processes that are involved in transferring usage into grammar (d). A key insight
regarding (d) is of course that repetition contributes to the learning, routinization,
and thus entrenchment of constructions (Bybee 2006; Langacker 2008: 16; Divjak
and Caldwell-Harris 2015). This insight has certainly been a major step forward
towards a better understanding of how grammar emerges from usage and has
spawned an impressive body of corpus-based investigations of lexical and gram-
matical phenomena (see, e. g., Glynn and Fischer 2010).
However, the quantitative turn in Cognitive Linguistics brought about by
this insight has also contributed to aggravating the predicament into which
Cognitive Linguistics had already maneuvered itself by taking the usage-based
premise on board. If we are serious about this premise, explanantia (c), (d) and
(e) rise dramatically in importance and put a considerable extra burden on the
promise of cognitive-linguistic theories. The reason is that they widen the range
of the predictors of grammatical structure from cognitive to numerous other
factors and mechanisms that can possibly contribute to the emergence of
grammar from usage. As a result, Cognitive Linguistics has to venture far beyond
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the terrain allocated by its traditional mission. The most pressing of these
questions pertain to the social, pragmatic, and sociopragmatic aspects of lan-
guage that co-determine the way in which grammar emerges from usage and
their interaction with cognitive processes:
– What are the effects of social structures and networks on linguistic experi-
ence in usage events and on the cognitive processes that mediate between
usage and knowledge?
– What is the precise nature of the way in which the cognitive processes
respond to the numerous pragmatic and sociopragmatic facets of usage
events such as the communicative intentions of speakers, the social char-
acteristics of the participants, and the social relations between them?
– What is the precise nature of these mediating processes, both cognitive and
social ones?
To be sure, the mere fact that these questions are important has been taken for
granted by many cognitive linguists all along (see, e. g., Langacker 2016). Some
researchers in the field have actually been emphasizing the need for a social turn
in Cognitive Linguistics for some time, most forcefully perhaps Harder (2010), but
also, among others, Kristiansen and Dirven (2008), Croft (2009), and Geeraerts
(2016; see Geeraerts and Kristiansen 2015 for a survey). Nevertheless, I believe it
remains fair to say that the precise role played by social and especially pragmatic
and sociopragmatic aspects in the transformation of usage into shared linguistic
knowledge is not only still underestimated, but also not adequately integrated into
cognitive-linguistic models of language. It is one thing to acknowledge in principle
that pragmatic and sociolinguistic insights are important, but it is a challenge of
quite a different order to come up with a unified model that incorporates them as
integral parts of the predictive machinery. Therefore I would like to devote the
present piece to justifying why Cognitive Linguistics should embrace the social,
pragmatic, and sociopragmatic dimensions of language more seriously (Section 2),
and to sketching a way in which this could be done (Section 3).
2 Why should Cognitive Linguistics embrace
the pragmatic and social dimension of language?
2.1 The logical why
A closer scrutiny of the nature of linguistic experience provides the best start for
running through the logical argument. Linguistic experience is collected in
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usage, and usage takes place in actual usage events. These in turn take place in
social encounters between interactants who do many things in addition to using
linguistic constructions: they try to make their communicative intentions
mutually manifest, perform linguistic and non-linguistic acts (Austin 1962),
and pursue extra-linguistic goals. In addition to these more narrowly “prag-
matic” acts, they perform “sociopragmatic acts”: they act out social roles and
negotiate interpersonal relations on the basis of numerous social features of the
usage event that they cannot help taking in: what is the person I am talking to
like; what is the social relation between us; which identity am I going to assume
here in view of this; what is the nature of the speech event; what are the norms
and conventions of the speech event? If it is assumed that grammar derives from
usage, and if we follow Halliday (1994) and others in further assuming that the
interpersonal function of communication is at least as important as the idea-
tional one for conveying and understanding meanings, then all these pragmatic
and sociopragmatic facets of usage must clearly be factored into the model itself
rather than being outsourced to other disciplines.
This is also mandatory because pragmatic and sociopragmatic, as well as
genuinely social factors are in fact logically prior to cognitive factors. The input
that the cognitive system gets and can work with is not only modulated by
pragmatic and social exigencies, but actually afforded by the communicative
intentions causing someone to use language in the first place, and motivated by
the social activities, networks, and environments of language users. Whether
speakers come across a certain word or construction, and how often and in
which contexts they do so is ultimately determined by these communicative
intentions, social environments and social processes.
It must thus be assumed on simple logical grounds that grammatical
knowledge is not only distilled from ideational and structural properties of
usage events, but also from the interpersonal, social and pragmatics ones (see
Geeraerts 2016, for a more extensive theoretical discussion of this claim). What is
more, these different properties of usage events are intertwined to such an
extent that they can and must not be separated in such a way that only some
of them are included inside the model. The next section will offer some empirical
observations supporting this claim.
2.2 Empirical whys
First, consider one of the most fundamental insights of variationist sociolinguis-
tics: speakers’ linguistic preferences and habits co-vary with memberships in
social groups (Tagliamonte 2006: 5–7). How could this fact be explained from a
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usage-based cognitive-linguistic perspective? Presumably, we would assume
that the members of a social group or community of practice form linguistic
routines and acquire linguistic knowledge by being exposed to the output of
other members of the same social group. However, such group-specific
entrenchment effects are only possible if we also assume that speakers store a
tacit association linking the formal and semantic properties of constructions
with knowledge about the groups of speakers who typically use these construc-
tions. Both the structural and the interpersonal aspects must be part of what is
distilled from usage into grammar.
Second, speakers do not only vary with regard to their own linguistic
preferences, but they also have tacit or even explicit knowledge about the social
values and meanings of the linguistic choices of others (Harder 2010).
Knowledge of the stylistic meanings of constructions and their distribution
across registers and genres arguably has the same roots: it derives from stored
associations between formal and semantic properties of constructions, on the
one hand, and situational, social and cultural contexts in which these construc-
tions are typically used, on the other. In short, it is gleaned from rich experience
in a myriad of usage events which are all marked for their social characteristics.
Finally, the effects of the processing of pragmatic, sociopragmatic, and
social aspects of usage events can be observed in numerous mechanisms of
language change such as grammaticalization, lexicalization, and especially
semantic change by context-induced (re-)interpretation (Heine et al. 1991: Ch.
3) or invited inference (Traugott and Dasher 2004: 34–41). Details and illustra-
tions of this will be given in Section 3.3 below.
In short, observations from the fields of variationist and interactionist socio-
linguistics, from stylistics and discourse analysis, from semantics, and from
language change support the logical argument that pragmatic, sociopragmatic,
and social aspects of linguistic usage are inextricably intertwined with structural
aspects in influencing the emergence of grammar from usage.
3 How could Cognitive Linguistics embrace
the pragmatic and social dimension of language?
Up to this point I have argued that Cognitive Linguistics must spell out, rather
than just acknowledge, the social and pragmatic dimension of language and
integrate them within models of language use and linguistic knowledge. To the
best of my knowledge, approaches that do justice to this insight have not been
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proposed so far. Geeraerts (2016) makes a powerful plea for integrating a socio-
semiotic perspective into Cognitive Linguistics. However, as far as the pragmatic
dimension is concerned, he mainly emphasizes that the socially shared linguis-
tic system transcends the subjective communicative intentions of individuals
from which it emerges. How this emergent process is to be modelled is not his
main interest. Zlatev (2016) stresses the importance of intentionality and signitive
intentions, but uses these terms in a phenomenological and semiotic rather than
a pragma(linguis)tic sense.
I have tried to fill this gap by developing the so-called Entrenchment-and
Conventionalization Model (see Schmid 2014, 2015; Schmid and Mantlik 2015),
which is designed to integrate social, sociopragmatic, and pragmatic aspects
into a cognitive-linguistic framework. This model owes massively to a large
number of sources of inspiration ranging from “traditional” Cognitive
Linguistics and usage-based approaches to the study of language structure,
language change, and language acquisition to neurolinguistics, sociolinguistics,
and pragmatics (see Schmid 2015: 5, for references). In view of the limited scope
and specific aims of the present paper, I will only give a rough sketch of the
main components of this model and then focus on the role played by social and
(socio-)pragmatic aspects in it.
3.1 The EC-Model in broad brush strokes
The EC-Model consists of the four components presented in Figure 1: (1) usage
and the activities it consists of; (2) a set of cognitive processes subsumed under
the term entrenchment; (3) a set of social processes subsumed under the term
conventionalization; and (4) a set of forces acting on usage, entrenchment, and
conventionalization, as well as on the interaction between them. The central
prediction of the model is that grammar is continuously re-organized by the
interaction of entrenchment and conventionalization processes. These are
triggered and sustained by the different activities involved in usage under
the influence of cognitive, pragmatic, emotive-affective, and social forces.
Entrenchment and conventionalization differ in terms of the nature of the
processes involved and are therefore to be treated as separate systems which
only interact via usage, as is indicated by the overlapping ellipses in Figure 1
(see Schmid 2015: 10–11 for a justification of this claim).
Entrenchment is defined in this model as the on-going reorganization of the
associative network representing individual linguistic knowledge by means of
the routinization of patterns of associations and their (re-)schematization. The
term conventionalization subsumes social processes that are involved in the
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continuous mutual coordination and matching of linguistic knowledge and
practices. The social processes that are considered necessary for an adequate
account of empirical findings are innovation, co-adaptation (or accommoda-
tion), diffusion, and (implicit and explicit) normation. Prominent forces that
have been identified so far include:
– cognitive forces: similarity, contiguity, salience, categorization, gestalt
processing;
– pragmatic forces: settings, participants, event types, intentions, goals;
– emotive-affective forces: egocentrism, emotion, need for admiration, fun,
empathy;
– social forces: social networks, identity and group-membership allocation,
solidarity, peer-group pressure, prestige.
With this rough sketch of the overall model in mind, we can now turn to a closer
look at how social, pragmatic, and sociopragmatic aspects are represented in the
model and how they can be operationalized.
3.2 How social aspects are implemented in the EC-Model
Social aspects are integrated in the EC-Model in two ways: in the form of the
conventionalization processes rendered on the right-hand side of Figure 1, and
in the form of social forces. Social aspects are thus modelled in a dynamic
fashion, i. e., as processes and forces. Traditional sociolinguistic variables such
as region, gender, or age are treated as processes of group-membership
allocation which act as pragmatic and social forces mediated by pragmatic
associations (see below). Methodologically speaking, the conventionalization
processes of innovation, co-adaptation, diffusion, and normation play the role
of dependent variables, whose outcomes can be measured in different ways
(again, see below for more details). In contrast, social forces like group-
membership allocation, social network structure and density, peer-group
pressure, and prestige are independent variables alongside other co-predictors
including not only the other types of forces but also the cognitive entrenchment
processes. In what follows, some more concrete suggestions as to how linguists
can “use the E&C model in their daily descriptive/analytical practice”, as
Dagmar Divjak put it in her review of an earlier version of this paper, will
be given.
The process of innovation, which makes up the starting-point of the
conventionalization process of new utterance types, lends itself to an initial
illustration of the way in which the dynamics of social aspects are
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operationalized in the EC-Model. Innovation can roughly be defined as a process
whose observable outcome is an utterance which is not licensed by a
conventionalized utterance type. This product of an act of innovation is brought
to life in the cognitive system by new associations which are based on existing
association patterns (unless an utterance or word is created ex nihilo, which is
very unusual). The process of innovation itself is triggered and supported by
many factors which play the role of independent variables in empirical studies:
by cognitive forces such as similarity (metaphor), contiguity (metonymy), ana-
logy (based on single words or productive patterns), and other forms of re-
categorization (e. g., taxonomic changes); by social forces (e. g., peer-group
pressure, prestige); by pragmatic forces (e. g., types of settings and participants);
and by emotive-affective forces (fun, need for admiration). Importantly, what
renders an innovation new and original is its difference to collectively
conventionalized rather than to individually entrenched utterance types. What
is new to one speaker may be perfectly conventional to another and vice versa.
Innovation can thus only be explained by a model that keeps track not only of
the current state of the associative network of the individual speakers, but also
of the current state regarding the conventionality of an utterance type in the
speech community. Since what is new ultimately depends on what is conven-
tional, and not on what is entrenched, innovation is treated as a social process.
In the case of innovation, the observable datum is the actual utterance
which is assessed as new against the backdrop of conventionalized utterance
Figure 1: General outline of the EC-Model (taken from Schmid 2015: 7).
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types. Evidence for co-adaptation processes is available in the form of
repetitions of utterances or utterance types within the limits of one usage
situation (Schmid 2015: 17–18). Evidence of this type can be collected in experi-
mental studies (e. g., Fine et al. 2013) or by means of qualitative conversation-
based methods such as discourse analysis or conversation analysis which have
so far not been in the focus of attention of cognitive linguists. Valuable
examples of studies of this type come from the tradition of discourse metaphor
(e. g., Cameron and Deignan 2006) and from the emergentist tradition in
conversation analysis (e. g., Auer and Pfänder 2011) which, inspired by the
work of Paul Hopper (1987), looks into the sedimentation of conversational
patterns in the linguistic system.
Diffusion and implicit normation (i. e., normation by usualization rather
than by codification), the third and fourth social processes, take us closer to
the quantitative, corpus-based studies which have come to dominate empirical
approaches to Cognitive Linguistics over the past years (e. g., Glynn and Fischer
2010). Frequency of occurrence, the key dependent variable in most of these
studies, first and foremost measures degrees of diffusion and usualization in
speech communities or the parts thereof that are specified by the selection of
corpora. From a cognitive-linguistic perspective, it is of course tempting to argue
that increasing diffusion simply corresponds to more distributed entrenchment,
i. e., to an increase in the number of members of a community who have a
representation. This would render the process of diffusion redundant, because
its job would be done by entrenchment processes. The very vagueness of the
phrase “have a representation”, however, already indicates the pitfall involved
in this temptation: the same conventionalized utterance types can be entrenched
in distinctly different ways in the minds of different speakers. Conventionality
essentially means that speakers tacitly and mutually agree on how to solve
communicative tasks given a range of equally arbitrary options (Lewis 1969;
Croft 2000). Since this agreement relates to ways of putting things, conventio-
nalization operates over utterance types, i. e., linguistic surface phenomena.
Entrenchment, on the other hand, operates over patterns of associations, i. e.,
mental phenomena, which can differ substantially from speaker to speaker. The
same utterance type can be represented in very different ways in terms of such
dimensions as size and schematicity. Therefore, increasing diffusion in a speech
community must not be reduced to more distributed entrenchment. By the same
token, the existence of constructions, if defined as entrenched and conventiona-
lized form–meaning/function pairings, should not be postulated rashly, since
one conventionalized utterance type can be entrenched in different ways and to
different degrees in the minds of different speakers. This is demonstrated for
conventional German utterance types used for spatial descriptions of the type
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vorne rechts (“front right”) vs. in der vorderen rechten Ecke (“in the front right
corner”) in eye-tracking studies by Günther (2016). Chang (2016) shows the same
from a neurolinguistic perspective for various utterance types in Mandarin using
the MMN component of ERPs.
3.3 How pragmatic and sociopragmatic aspects are integrated
in the EC-Model
The main aim of integrating pragmatic and sociopragmatic aspects is to model
how context-dependent phenomena eventually sediment into entrenched
routines and conventionalized utterance types. This is taken care of by three
components of the EC-Model: pragmatic and sociopragmatic aspects are
registered during sensory, cognitive, and neuronal activities, modulated by
pragmatic forces, and mediated to entrenchment processes by pragmatic
associations.
First, sensory activities are responsible for the perception of situational
characteristics of usage events, including information about settings and social
characteristics of participants. The cognitive and neuronal activities involved in
usage make a similarly fundamental contribution to explaining higher-level
pragmatic effects such as pragmatic enrichment, context-sensitive disambigua-
tion, and the working out of inferences of various types, including indirect
speech acts (Searle 1975) and conversational implicatures (Grice 1975)
(see below for more details and methodological implications).
Second, the effects of these activities on the entrenchment processes of
association, routinization, and schematization are modulated by pragmatic
forces. The extent to which individual processing events contribute to the
routinization and schematization of association patterns depends on such
pragmatic forces as our judgment of the kind of situation we find ourselves in
(“setting”), the kind of interlocutors we are talking and listening to (“partici-
pants”), as well as their and our own communicative intentions and goals.
Third, the link between the sensory, cognitive, and neuronal activities and
entrenchment processes is established by means of pragmatic associations.
These connect sensory input garnered from the situation with the linguistic
knowledge “stored” in the associative network. By linking usage and entrench-
ment, pragmatic associations play a key role in predicting the effects observed in
Section 2.2. Repeated pragmatic associations between what is said in a given
situation type and what is intended and achieved result in associative routines
representing illocutionary acts, both direct and indirect (Searle 1975). The
famous “illocutionary force indicating devices” (Searle 1969) such as sentence
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mood and intonation are thus explained in terms of routinized pragmatic
associations between formal properties of utterance types and communicative
intentions. The pathway towards such routinized pragmatic associations can be
observed in highly conventionalized indirect speech acts such as could you pass
me the salt or do you mind if I smoke. The result of this process is context-
induced language change (see Section 2.2), in which existing elements and
routines acquire new meanings and functions that can ultimately be activated
outside the corresponding contexts. The new meanings are subserved by new or
newly enriched symbolic associations rather than computed by means of
inferences drawn with the help of pragmatic associations.
The same rationale explains the other cases discussed in Section 2.2.
Here, sociopragmatic rather than genuinely pragmatic aspects come to the
fore. Sociolinguistic preferences and sociolinguistic awareness as well as
style and register awareness come about by the entrenchment of pragmatic
associations connecting sociopragmatic experience in concrete usage
events with the formal and semantic properties of the linguistic elements
used in them.
While all these processes as such can be described in the form of general
pragmatic mechanisms, the way they apply in specific contexts remains largely
unpredictable. This is one of the main reasons why they have not played a
prominent role in empirical studies so far and why the field of cognitive
pragmatics has not yet managed to exhaust its full potential (Bara 2010;
Schmid 2012). The operationalization of pragmatic and sociopragmatic aspects
thus poses a particularly daunting challenge both for the EC-Model and for
Cognitive Linguistics in general.
To tackle the easier part first, some of the standard pragmatic and
sociopragmatic variables and forces are by no means new to Cognitive
Linguistics, but have been integrated as independent variables in corpus-
based and experimental studies all along: pragmatic variables such as medium
(written, spoken, signed, computer-mediated), mode (monologue, dialogue,
mass communication etc.), setting (private, public, institutional etc.), and social
characteristics of participants are often included as co-predictors in multivariate
corpus-based studies and should be controlled for in experimental studies. This
also holds for more or less direct grammatical reflections of pragmatic aspects,
for example sentence mood (declarative, interrogative, imperative) as a rough
indicator of types of illocutionary acts, as well as topicalization and focus
constructions, theme-rheme distribution, and the position and weight (i. e.,
length) of constituents as markers of information structure.
The long-term effects of interpretative processes such as pragmatic enrich-
ment and conversational implicature on entrenchment and conventionalization
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are much harder to operationalize, mainly because these processes are – by
definition – context-dependent. The main handle for grasping them methodolo-
gically lies in the usage-based premise: context-dependent inferential processes
are only able to have an effect on entrenchment and conventionalization if they
are repeated. Similar utterances must give rise to similar pragmatic associations
in similar contextual and cotextual environments. The key to spotting the effects
of repeated pragmatic processes thus lies in the observation of repeated usage
patterns that are associated with specific communicative intentions and/or non-
literal meanings in specifiable contexts and co-texts. For corpus studies, this
means that attestations of lexico-grammatic patterns must be subjected to close
manual analysis of cotexts, contexts, meanings, and communicative functions
(cf. Schmid 2013, 2014). In diachronic corpus investigations, changes with regard
to the entrenchment and conventionalization of pragmatic associations can be
indicated by salient non-linear developments of frequency of usage, and/or by
noticeable inter-individual variation regarding the communicative functions of
lexico-grammatical patterns (Schmid and Mantlik 2015).
4 Conclusion and outlook
Cognitive linguists have produced a massive body of work contributing
substantially to our understanding of how language works, and so have our
colleagues in different branches of pragmatics and sociolinguistics. Why, the
reader may be inclined to ask, should we give up this successful division of
labor and begin to integrate pragmatics and sociolinguistics inside cognitive-
linguistic models rather than keeping them outside as esteemed neighbors
willing to give us a helping hand when necessary? The answer given in this
paper essentially boils down to the well-known truism that everything hangs
together with everything. Grammar, both individual and collective, is not only
shaped by cognitive principles and processes, but also by the pragmatic,
interpersonal, and social functions of language, and by pragmatic and social
processes and forces. What is more, all these processes and forces constantly
interact to such an extent that it is very difficult or even impossible to
disentangle their effects. This means they must all be the integrated in the
model. In this paper, I have tried to make a case for this insight and to offer a
glimpse of how the Entrenchment-and-Conventionalization Model attempts to
do justice to it.
As regards the future development of Cognitive Linguistics, I personally do
not expect that Cognitive Linguistics will eventually dissolve into a hotchpotch
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of sociopragmacognitive usage-based emergentism. For one thing, despite on-
going attempts in many sciences to keep sight of the bigger picture, the trend
towards increasing specialization is unlikely to be reversed, because the more
detailed our questions become the more local in-depth expertise will be required
for answering them. And for another, even if the EC-Model and similar
integrative approaches like the theory of complex adaptive systems (The Five
Graces Group 2009) may prove to hold some appeal, it is obvious that their main
theoretical strength, i. e., their wide scope and considerable explanatory
potential, is also their main methodological weakness: the whole models as
such are very difficult, if not impossible, to test.1 What such models can do,
however, is spawn more concrete falsifiable hypotheses that can be tested in
ways suggested in the present paper and exemplified by studies like
Chang (2016), Günther (2016), and Schmid and Mantlik (2015). My prediction
therefore is that even if the number of cognitive linguists who strive to integrate
pragmatic, sociopragmatic, and social aspects might be going to increase over
the next years, it is unlikely that this will do much harm to the cognitive-
linguistic enterprise as such.
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